Poonam Sharma
1. Return of Hardliners and Strategic Implications
India and Bangladesh share one of the longest land borders in South Asia, making political developments in Dhaka deeply consequential for New Delhi. Over the past decade, cooperation under Sheikh Hasina’s leadership significantly improved counter-terror coordination, intelligence sharing, and cross-border security.
However, BNP’s historical record paints a more complicated picture. During previous BNP administrations, India repeatedly flagged concerns about safe havens for insurgent groups targeting its northeastern states. Allegations linking some BNP figures to extremist outfits, including Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), raised long-standing security anxieties.
The rehabilitation of such figures into mainstream politics may embolden hardline networks. If anti-India rhetoric becomes part of political consolidation in Bangladesh, it risks turning the eastern border into a zone of renewed instability. Two things cannot go together: expanding strategic partnership and political empowerment of forces hostile to India.
The optics matter as much as policy. A Parliament that includes individuals previously convicted in cases involving anti-India terror accusations sends a message — both domestically and regionally — that ideological hardliners are back in business.
2. Pakistan’s Deep State and the Bangladesh Factor
Another dimension that cannot be ignored is Pakistan’s strategic calculus. Historically, elements within Pakistan’s security establishment have viewed Bangladesh as a potential theatre to counterbalance India’s influence in South Asia.
If hardline forces consolidate power in Dhaka, Islamabad’s deep state may attempt to revive dormant networks or cultivate ideological partnerships. The BNP’s perceived proximity to pro-Pakistan elements in the past has been a persistent concern in Indian strategic circles.
India’s northeastern region remains sensitive to cross-border radicalization and infiltration. Even limited tolerance for extremist infrastructure across the border could disrupt years of stabilization efforts.
The broader concern is geopolitical: India already faces active tensions on its western and northern fronts. A hostile or unstable eastern flank would stretch security resources and strategic bandwidth. A “dangerous neighbourhood” is not merely rhetorical — it translates into economic, military, and diplomatic costs.
3. Rethinking India’s Bangladesh Policy
India has been one of Bangladesh’s largest development partners, investing heavily in connectivity, power projects, credit lines, and trade facilitation. Bilateral trade has expanded substantially, and infrastructure cooperation has deepened interdependence.
But policy realism demands reassessment. If anti-India forces shape Dhaka’s strategic posture, New Delhi may need to recalibrate its approach.
First, economic assistance should be tied to transparent security assurances. Second, intelligence cooperation must be insulated from political shifts. Third, India must diversify its engagement beyond ruling elites and build stronger civil society and business linkages.
Cutting down helping business abruptly may not be prudent, but conditional engagement becomes essential. Strategic generosity without political reciprocity creates asymmetry.
Indian officials have described themselves as “cautiously optimistic” about Tarique Rahman’s leadership. Yet optimism must be backed by verification. A pragmatic foreign policy from Dhaka would ease concerns; an ideological pivot would deepen distrust.
The hardliners have won — that much is clear. Whether they will govern as pragmatists or ideologues remains to be seen. For India, the stakes are high. Stability in Bangladesh is not optional; it is foundational to India’s eastern security architecture.
In geopolitics, neighbourhoods matter. And when the neighbourhood grows uncertain, strategy must adapt.
